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INTRODUCTION: WORKING TOWARD FAIR
TREATMENT FOR RETAIL INVESTORS
Barbara Black*
ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc.

Twenty years ago, in
the

Supreme Court held that brokerage firms

v.

McMahon, I

could require their

customers to arbitrate all their disputes in industry-sponsored fora-a
decision that had great significance for the law of arbitration as well as
securities regulation.
report,2

assessing

In

the

1996,

a blue-ribbon task force released its

secuntles

arbitration

process

at

National

Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) the principal securities
arbitration forum,3 and the report led to several symposia on the topic
coinciding with the tenth anniversary of

McMahon. 4

Since then,

arbitration scholars and practitioners have intensified the debate over the
fairness of arbitration, both generally5 and specifically in the context of
6
In addition, in the last ten years, the

brokerage customers' disputes.

stock market has undergone a boom and bust cycle that generated a
record number of customers' claims filed at NASD;7 the securities

* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of
Cincinnati College of Law. My gratitude goes to all the Symposium participants, each of whom causes
me to think more deeply about these issues, and to the Corporate Law Fellows and members of the
University 0/ Cincinnati Law Review, for their assistance in putting on this Symposium.
\. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2. SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REpORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. (1996).
This report is commonly referred to as the Ruder Report, after the name of its Chair, David S. Ruder, a
former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair. See Press Release, NASD, Arbitration Task
Force Issues 70 Recommendations in Largest Revamping of Securities Arbitration Since Its Start More
Than a Century Ago (Jan. 22, 1996), available at http://www.finra.orgiPressRoom/NewsReleases
II 996NewsReleases/pOl 0550.
3. Effective July 2007, the arbitration functions of NASD and the New York Stock Exchange
were consolidated as part of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the largest nongovernmental regulator for securities firms doing business in the United States. See FINRA, About the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, available at http://www.finra.orgiAboutFINRAICorporatelnfo
rmationlindex.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
4. See, e.g., Symposium, Securities Arbitration: A Decade After McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REv.
1329 (1996).
5. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimal Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REv.
383 (2008) (reviewing the literature).
6. See Bibliography o/Selected Securities Arbitration Resources/rom 1997-2007,76 U. CrN. L.
REV. 599 (2008).
7. A record 8945 customers' claims were filed in 2003, in contrast to 5631 claims filed in 1996.
See FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.finra.orgiArbitrationMediationiFINRADispute
ResolutioniStatistics/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
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industry has continued to market new investment products, strategies,
and services for retail investors;8 and the aging population has
increasingly become aware of the importance of investing for retirement,
but has also become susceptible to deceptive promises offering freedom
from financial worries. 9 As a result of these developments, now is an
opportune time for a re-examination of arbitration and investors'
remedies. The March 31, 2007 Symposium provided just such an
opportunity, and I am proud to introduce the participants' Articles, each
of which is an important contribution to the scholarship in this area.
Professor Jeffrey Stempel and Professor Stephen Ware address the
question of fairness in "mass," or consumer, arbitration, of which
securities arbitration is a prime example. Professor Stempel is a forceful
advocate of government-mandated procedural and substantive ground
rules to ensure the fair and effective operation of mass arbitration. In
particular, he argues that the judicial process should be the benchmark
for measuring the quality of arbitration. lo Professor Stephen Ware
focuses on an often-overlooked mandatory aspect of securities
arbitration that conflicts with the contractual basis for arbitration. II
Under NASD rules, brokerage firms are required to arbitrate customers'
disputes if the customer so chooses.1 2 As a result, even if a brokerage
firm wished to resolve customers' disputes in court, it would still be
required to arbitrate at an individual customer's request. Professor Ware
raises the intriguing possibility that at least some firms might be willing
to drop their arbitration agreements if NASD did not impose a duty on
brokerage firms to arbitrate, allowing a customer for whom judicial
resolution of disputes was important to select a brokerage firm on that
basis.
Professor Jennifer Johnson and Professor Edward Brunet, on the one
8. One example is the marketing of fee-based accounts instead of the traditional commissionbased accounts. The D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC's controversial rule that would have exempted
brokers offering fee-based accounts from regulation as investment advisers. See Financial Planning
Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
9. According to the SEC, "Nearly one-third of all U.S. investors are between 50 and 64 years of
age, and approximately 5 million senior citizens succumb to financial abuse each year." SEC, For
Seniors, http://www.sec.govlinvestor/seniors.shtml(lastvisitedJan.30.2008).In 2004, NASD Investor
Education Foundation awarded a research grant to WISE Senior Services in Los Angeles to investigate
fraud that targets older Americans. Its counter-intuitive finding was that investment fraud victims
demonstrated a better understanding of basic financial literacy than non-victims. See NASD INVESTOR
EDUC.
FOUND.,
INVESTOR FRAUD
STUDY
FINAL
REpORT (2006),
available
at
http://www.finrafoundation.orgIWISE_InvestorJraud_StudyJinal_Report.pdf.
10. See Stempel, supra note 5.
II. See Stephen J. Ware, What Makes Securities Arbitration DifJerentfrom Other Consumer and
Employment Arbitration?, 76 U. CIN. L REv. 447 (2008).
12. Similarly, Professor Ware also objects to the SRO requirement that securities employees
arbitrate their employment disputes. See id.
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hand, and Professor Jill Gross, on the other, deal specifically with the
issue of fairness in securities arbitration. Professor Johnson and
Professor Brunet assert that the greatest defect in the securities
arbitration process is the failure of the NASD forum to require its
arbitrators to apply substantive law, with the result that the application
of substantive law occurs sporadically and inconsistently in present-day
securities arbitration. 13
In contrast, Professor Gross argues that
criticisms of the fairness of securities arbitration stem primarily from
misunderstandings of the law, not from defects in the process or failures
of the arbitrators. 14 Investors' dissatisfaction with the securities
arbitration forum may well result not from deficiencies in the forum's
procedures or with its arbitrators, but from the application of antiinvestor laws. Accordingly, since current law severely limits investors'
remedies in court, investors may actually fare better in arbitration.
I have outlined above the major issues on which the professors
disagree, but I am struck by the major areas of agreement as well. In
contrast to many investors' perceptions as reported in the media,15 all the
professors reflect, to varying degrees, a consensus that NASD
procedures are fair, setting aside the controversy over the presence of a
non-public, or "industry," arbitrator on every three-person arbitration
panel. 16 Thus, the debate crystallizes around the application of
substantive law in securities arbitration and the appropriate role for
judicial review. Requiring arbitrators to apply the substantive law
would have significant impact on the arbitration forum. First, the role of
the arbitrators would be primarily that of judges and not that of a jury.
Accordingly, arbitrators would need additional training in the applicable
law. This, however, presupposes the existence of applicable law, which
is problematic since McMahon's privatization of the law. Second, the
composition of the arbitration panels would also need to change and
consist primarily, if not exclusively, of lawyers. Certain investors'
advocates, however, would not welcome these developments, as they
believe that more favorable outcomes are likely when arbitrators reflect
13. See Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76
U. CIN. L. REv. 4S9 (2008).
14. See Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities
Arbitration, 76 U. ON. L. REv. 493 (2008).
IS. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Dear S.E.c., Reconsider Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2007, § 3, available at http://select.nytimes.comJ2007/0SI06Ibusiness/yourrnoney/06gret.html?
pagewanted= I &n=Top/ReferencelTimes%20Topics/PeoplelM/Morgenson,%20Gretchen&_r= 1#.
16. Rule 12402 of the NASD Customer Code of Arbitration requires that every three-person
arbitration panel include one non-public (commonly referred to as "industry") arbitrator, as defined in
Rule 12100(p). NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES, R. 12402 (Nat'l
Ass'n Sec. Dealers, Inc. 2007), available at http://www.finra.orglweb/groupslrules_regs/documents
lrule_fiIinglpOI836S.pdf.
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the real-life experiences of their investor-clients. 17
Moreover, all of the professors agree that the current level of judicial
involvement does not provide for meaningful review of the substance of
the arbitrators' decisions; they disagree, however, on whether it should.
Allowing for greater judicial review of the substance of the arbitrators'
decision would require not just the preservation of the arbitration record
(which NASD already requires), but also at least some statement by the
arbitrators of the reasons for their decision as well as development of a
judicial standard of review more searching than "manifest disregard of
the law.,,18 However, when NASD proposed a rule change requiring
arbitrators to give reasons for their decision if requested by the
customer, the response from investors' advocates was lukewarm. 19 As a
practical matter, greater judicial review of arbitration awards would
increase the workload of the judiciary, a result that is at odds with the
Supreme Court's pro-arbitration policy. As a matter of policy, more
judicial involvement in the arbitration process would also mark the
culmination of efforts to transform the arbitration process into a minor
league judicial system. While the advisability of this policy is worthy of
debate, adoption of this approach, with its attendant greater
responsibilities on arbitrators, is unlikely to work under the current
securities arbitration system of nonprofessional arbitrators who serve on
an occasional basis, with minimal compensation. 20
Since much of the current debate centers around the role of
substantive law in securities arbitration, the contributions of Professor
Jennifer O'Hare and Professor Mercer Bullard permit useful
comparisons of the judicial and arbitration systems with their thoughtful
analyses of the law on remedies as it affects two categories of retail
investors whose claims are litigated in court: the investor who sues the
corporate issuer for securities fraud and the mutual fund investor who
sues the fund and its affiliates for mispricing and sales abuses. Professor
O'Hare explores the "distinctly anti-investor flavor" to federal securities
laws that disadvantages, in particular, defrauded retail investors and
demonstrates that anti-investor bias is real and, given the deregulatory
climate, unlikely to change. 21 Her conclusion-that retail investors have
17. The Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) has encouraged recruitment of
arbitrators from diverse segments of the community. See Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association,
https:llsecure.piaba.org/piabaweblhtmllindex.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
18. See Gross, supra note 14 (noting the limits of the "manifest disregard" standard).
19. See Barbara Black & Jill Gross, The Explained Award of Damocles: Protection or Peril in
Securities Arbitration, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 17 (2006).
20. See Barbara Black, Do We Expect Too Much From NASD Arbitrators?, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Oct. 2004, at I.
21. Jennifer O'Hare, Retail Investor Remedies under Rule IOb-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 521 (2008).
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no choice but to view false corporate disclosure as just another cost of
investing or to invest in mutual funds-is especially disturbing, in light
of Professor Bullard's examination of the legal obstacles confronting
mutual fund investors.22
Professor Bullard explores the possible impact of Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 23 and its interpretation of loss causation
on claims asserted by mutual fund investors. He warns that Dura could
foreclose all private claims against mutual funds, if applied consistently
with loss causation involving operating companies. Courts would have
to treat "value" and "loss" differently in the mutual fund context to
permit claims based on misleading information about their services and
sales practices. Professor Bullard concludes that courts should interpret
the loss causation requirement in a way that treats mutual funds as both
investments and service providers and recognizes that they are
fundamentally different from operating companies. Unfortunately, the
courts' consistent track record of failing to recognize mutual fund
investors' claims 24 gives little reason to be optimistic about how they
will apply Dura to mutual fund claims.
Why are both categories of retail investors disfavored in the law?
Two obvious explanations are politics and policy. Congress and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are subject to political
pressure by well-organized and well-funded groups representing
business interests,25 and retail investors do not have lobbyists on K
Street.
It may also reflect a decision that strong government
enforcement to deter violations is a better policy choice than private
securities litigation. In the last twenty years, Congress has consistently
increased SEC enforcement remedies 26 and created substantial barriers
to private securities litigation. 27
More fundamentally, I believe that the disfavored treatment of retail
investors reflects a deep cynicism not only in our judicial system but
22. Mercer E. Bullard, Dura, Loss Causation and Mutual Funds: A Requiem/or Private Claims?,
76 U. CIN. L. REV. 559 (2008).
23. 544

U.s. 336 (2005).

24. See Bullard, supra note 22, at nn.5-6 and accompanying text.

25. Fonner SEC Chair Arthur Levitt described the intense pressure he experienced from
members of Congress who received political contributions from the accounting industry when he
attempted to tighten accounting rules. See ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL
STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT You TO KNow, WHAT You CAN Do TO FIGHT BACK
236-239 (2002).
26. See, e.g., Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Refonn Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. \07-204, § 308,116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (Supp. V 2005».
27. Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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more generally in our society. In her recent book, Trust and Honesty,
Professor Tamar Frankel writes of the creation of a culture where fraud
and dishonesty become pervasive, accepted, and glorified. 28 In this
culture, "[bJlaming the victims establishes a reciprocal arrangement, in
which both parties are at fault. ,,29 The truth of this statement is
illustrated by the law's lack of sympathy for the gullible, unsophisticated
investor. 3o According to the law, reasonable investors are expected to
possess a certain level of understanding and sophistication to withstand
broker-dealer conduct. They should understand the time-value of
money, principles of diversification and risk, the securities industry's
compensation structure,31 as well as the differences between securities
brokers, investment advisers, and financial planners. 32 Reasonable
investors should not succumb to brokers' advertising claims,33 even
though brokerage firms spend millions of dollars in advertising to
convince investors that they should be their trusted financial advisors. 34
Another tactic to shift the blame to investors is to call them "greedy."
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, after the bubble burst in the
early 2000s, was quoted as condemning as a "disgrace" the alleged
fraudulent accounting, but he went on to say that those who have been
buying stocks at multiples that "never made any sense" should also look
in the mirror: "They're as responsible, I think, as those who actually
committed the crimes of misstating earnings and fudging the
numbers. ,,35
Most illustrative is the late Judge Irving Pollack's dismissal of a
securities fraud class action brought by investors who alleged that they
were harmed by deceptive recommendations made by securities
analysts. 36 Although the plaintiffs' case had difficulties, the vehemence
28. TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT ACROSSROAD
(2006).
29. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1033 (2d Cir. 1993)(holding that
a widow with a tenth grade education and no prior investment experience could not recover damages
from her broker who put her in a limited partnership interest that was unsuitable for her investment
objectives because she should have read and understood the prospectus).
31. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 991, 1037 (2002).
32. See Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers-What's in a Name?, II FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 31,35-39 (2005).
33. For a devastating critique of the "puffery" defense, see Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of
the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-Emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions,

59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697 (1998).
34. See Black, supra note 32, at 32 (describing how "prime time television advertising extolling
the services of brokerage firms has become part of American culture").
35. FRANKEL, supra note 28, at 35-36 (emphasis added).
36. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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in his opinion was stunning. He stated that the plaintiffs wanted:
to twist the federal securities laws into a scheme of cost-free speculators'
insurance .... [P]laintiffs would have this Court conclude that the federal
securities laws were meant to underwrite, subsidize, and encourage their
rash speculation in joining a freewheeling casino that lured thousands
obsessed with the fantasy of Olympian riches, but which delivered such
riches to only a scant handful oflucky winners. 37

This "blame the investor" sentiment is not new, as this statement from
the House of Representatives debate on the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 illustrates: "I also recognize another man who is very largely
responsible for the misfortunes of the country and the excessive stock
speculation and debacle. That is Mr. American Citizen who wants to get
something for nothing.,,38 To what extent this unsympathetic treatment
of the retail investor is bound up in our culture of rugged individuaIism39
or instead is the result of conscious governmental policies40 is beyond
the scope of this brief introduction.
The central theme of this Symposium is fair treatment for investors.
All the professors at the Symposium emphasize the importance to the
capital markets that investors perceive that they are treated fairly;41 all of
them express, to varying degrees, concerns about investors' fair
treatment. Yet retail investors continue to open brokerage accounts and
invest in corporate stocks directly or through mutual funds. This raises
an issue that may be more sociological than legal. How can we explain
investors' continued confidence in the capital markets given the abysmal
record of investor protection, particularly in the area of mutual funds,
which, at least until the recent market-timing scandals,42 enjoyed a
reputation as the best investment strategy for the retail investor to
achieve a well-diversified, well-managed portfolio at low cost? Are
they, as Professor O'Hare suggests, simply accepting it as a cost of
investing, just like commissions or mutual fund fees? Perhaps, then, as
37. Id. at 358.
38. 78 CONGo REC. 7861, 7862 (1934) (statement of Rep. Lea), reprinted in 1 FED. BAR ASS'N,
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 853 (1983).
39. See, e.g., Puckett V. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 587 So.2d 273, 278 (Miss. 1991)
(holding that a self-directed investor who lost over $2 million, including his retirement fund, in
commodities futures trading had no claim against his broker, reasoning, "One word encompasses all the
grandeur and majesty of western civilization. That word is 'freedom.' ... Not as well recognized, but
equally true is that the absolute concomitant offreedom is responsibility.").
40. FRANKEL, supra note 28, at 58.
41. On the importance of the participants' perceptions that the process is fair, see Nancy A.
Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice
Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 52 (2004).
42. See Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds:
Market Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235,236 (2006).
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Professor Gross states, investors' perceptions that they are being treated
unfairly cause them to focus their dissatisfaction on the securities
arbitration process as an outlet for their frustration. 43 Accepting these
realities, then, it is incumbent that (1) the securities arbitration process is
a fair process and is perceived as such, and (2) regulators are vigilant in
promulgating investor protection measures and enforcing them
aggressively.
The Symposium concluded with a roundtable discussion as a
distinguished panel of regulators and practitioners assessed the current
state of securities arbitration. I include an annotated synopsis44 of the
participants' remarks because of the importance of the topic. Each
participant discusses the current "hot" issues from his or her vantage
point and demonstrates that, whatever the drawbacks in the current
system, it does not lack for continual reevaluation from the regulators
and practitioners in the field.

43. See Gross, supra note 14. Many investors' claims involving mutual funds are brought in
arbitration against the brokers who recommended particular funds to their customers. Id.
44. The Current State of Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CrN. L. REv. 589 (2008). In addition, the
Symposium issue includes a bibliography of selected securities arbitration resources from 1997-2007,
updating an earlier bibliography included in the Brooklyn Law Review 10th Anniversary Symposium.
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